- “It is directed in the first place against the objectivism of the sciences, for which the world appears objectively as a universe of facts whose lawlike connection can be grasped descriptively. In truth, however, knowledge of the apparently objective world of facts has its transcendental basis in the prescientific world. The possible objects of scientific analysis are constituted a priori in the self-evidence of our primary life-world. In this layer phenomenology discloses the products of a meaning-generative subjectivity.”
- “Second, Husserl would like to show that this productive subjectivity disappears under the cover of an objectivistic self-understanding, because the sciences have not radically freed themselves from interests rooted in the primary life-world. Only phenomenology breaks with the naive attitude in favor of a rigorously contemplative one and definitively frees knowledge from interest.”
- “Third, Husserl identifies transcendental self-reflection, to which he accords the name of phenomenological description, with theory in the traditional sense. The philosopher owes the theoretical attitude to a transposition that liberates him from the fabric of empirical interests. In this regard theory is ‘unpractical.’ But this does not cut it off from practical life. For, according to the traditional concept, it is precisely the consistent abstinence of theory that produces action-orienting culture.”
Wednesday, June 10, 2009
July 26, 2006: Husserl's "Crisis" Revisited
In light of the focus of scienticism on controlling the world, this might be a good time to review some of the basic ideas behind Edmund Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences. A good summary of Husserl's critique of scientific thinking was provided by Habermas in his "Knowledge and Human Interests" lecture. Habermas breaks down Husserl's argument into three stages:
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