December 18, 2006: Another Triumph for Virtuality

It would appear that Time has now lined up behind all of the other lemmings trying to escape reality. They have drunk the Kool-Aid of Web 2.0 propaganda and named as Person of the Year the new Digital Everyman who locks out reality with his iPod earbuds, neverending cellphone activity, and a desperate search for companionship on Second Life. To reflect on a much older cover of this magazine, the question is not whether God is dead but whether, at least in the Time view of the world, reality is dead!

November 21, 2006 (2): The Hazardous Digital Highway

Today's E-Commerce Times includes an article by Christine Laue of the Omaha World-Herald explaining that iPods are becoming as big a road hazard as cell phones due to the increasing number of motorists wearing ear buds. Maybe it is time for us to take stock of what is really going on, whether it is on the sidewalks or the highways. What cell phones and music players have in common is how convenient they make it for their users to detach from reality (and, given its connotation in the drug world, the noun "user" seems more appropriate than ever). This, of course, goes hand-in-glove with the related attraction (addiction?) to virtual social environments, such as Second Life. Where this all points is to a "community" of individuals who cannot take their reality any more, whether it is too much traffic, pedestrians trying to cross the street where they want to make a turn, or just too many people in any setting. We have now provided these individuals with a means to "turn off" reality, just as Chance (with his television addiction) tried to do in Being There (a subtly ironic title for anyone who has read Heidegger). People who drive under such an "influence" are as dangerous (if not more so) than those who drive under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Do we have to wait for another incarnation of MADD before anyone does anything about this; and, if we go after the "dealers" where drugs are involved, should we not consider doing the same with these technologies?

October 24, 2006: Another Take on Fiction

My head is still reeling from reading the full transcript of the Israel Lobby "debate" posted by ScribeMedia. When so much effort is expended over "facts" with so little resolution, one begins to appreciate the "security" of fiction! Therefore, I shall retreat to an observation that Michael Wood recently made in his recent New York Review article about William Gass:

Fictions are not lies, or not necessarily lies, because they don't usually try to deceive. They arrange events and feelings, in the sense of a musical arrangement. They give experience an angle or a story. Sometimes we are not sure they are fictions—we just suspect them of some sort of stylization, catch in them what Brecht in another context calls "the scent of a mythology."

October 18, 2006: Teachers and Students

Yesterday, CNET News.com ran a story from Washington with the headline: "Google CEO: Techies must educate governments." So much for trying to address questions of reality and fiction! Admittedly, the report does not include any direct quote invoking this language. However, it is clear that Schmidt feels that our government needs such education ("The average person in government is not of the age of people who are using all this stuff"); so it seems to follow that it is up to the techies to correct this deplorable state of affairs. This is all very well and good to say from the splendid isolation of the Googleplex or the podium; but it does not seem to have occurred to Schmidt that the best education is always a two-way street. Thus, it has probably not occurred to him that it is as important for "those in the know about technology" to become better educated about the nature and working of governments as it is to inform others about the Internet's role in society. Did it even occur to him that the best teachers are the best listeners, rather than the best performers in front of a mass audience? Socrates knew this sort of thing and was very good at it, but my recent experience has shown that techies do not have much time for Socrates. If Schmidt does not watch out, he will find that the adversarial relationship in which he is already engaged will only get more adversarial!

October 17, 2006: More on Reality and Fiction

Perhaps it is not just that reality is "too much with us." Perhaps the ultimate virtue of fiction is that, at its best, it tells us more about reality than "reality itself!" Consider today's report in Assimilated Press (which, for my money, has now displaced The Onion as the best source of satirical journalism). The headline reads "Kansas Farmer See Cheney's Face In Cowpie;" and the author picks up this theme and runs with it at a breakneck pace never encountered in Swift. Like the best of satire, this reflects a reality with far more accuracy than conventional prose could ever do.

Technology has changed our perspective of reality, probably not for the better. A friend of mine used to observe that hand-drawn images in biology texts that predated the camera were almost always superior to any subsequent photographs. In this case the reason was simple: The photograph showed too much. On the other hand the drawing showed just enough to make sure that the reader saw what the author wanted him (or her) to see. So it is that satire provides the author with a better command of the reader's attention than expository prose can. Is it any wonder, then, that Jon Stewart is now regarded as a more credible news reporter than the network anchors; and, perhaps because he is more up front about his point of view and the motives behind his texts, he really is more credible!

October 16, 2006 (1): Postmodern News?

Any doubts we may have about the postmodern condition being more than a passing fad will have to confront today's press release from Reuters. I am not sure when was the last time (if ever) that Reuters released as story about itself; but it did so today to announce the opening of its "virtual news bureau" in Second Life. What is particularly interesting about this effort is the extent to which it is a dual endeavor:

"In 'Second Life,' we're making Reuters part of a new generation," Reuters Chief Executive Tom Glocer said in a statement. "We're playing an active role in this community by bringing the outside world into 'Second Life' and vice versa."

"Second Life" citizens can stay tuned to the latest headlines by using a feature called the Reuters News Center, a mobile device that users can carry inside the virtual environment. Stories will focus on both the fast-growing economy and culture of "Second Life" and also include links to Reuters news feeds from the outside world, ranging from Baghdad to Wall Street.

One wonders to what extent the "vice versa" will continue in the form of "standard" Reuters releases starting to cover events with Second Life.

So what is happening here? Do we now have a population that is so inured to seeing the world through their computer screens that "reality is too much with them?" Sherry Turkle tried to argue otherwise when the BBC ran a story about Second Life, but she may be too deep in her Life on the Screen mentality to see this in a broader context. The postmodern condition that this represents may well be a retreat into a world of fictions by those who seek a world that offers a stronger sense of empowerment and control.

September 13, 2006: One More Loss

I have to confess that, since I received all of my "serious" education at MIT, I never learned anything about Max Weber before I received my Ph.D. As a matter of fact, I remained in a state of naive ignorance until, late in my life, I finally decided to tackle Jürgen Habermas' monumental Theory of Communicative Action. What seems to have influenced me the most was a section Habermas wrote on "Weber's Diagnosis of the Times." Here is how Habermas introduced the diagnosis:

In his diagnosis of the times Weber keeps closer than usual to the theoretical perspective in which modernization is represented as a continuation of the world-historical process of disenchantment. The differentiation of independent cultural value spheres that is important for the phase of capitalism's emergence, and the growing autonomy of subsystems of purposive-rational action that is characteristic of the development of capitalist society since the late eighteenth century, are the two trends that Weber combines into an existential-individualistic critique of the present age. The first component is represented in the thesis of a loss of meaning, the second in the thesis of a loss of freedom.

This is pretty heavy stuff, even heavier when you think about how things have changed since Weber developed those theses: Under the impact of new technologies, we can hardly say they have changed for the better.

As a matter of fact, having just read Daniel Mendelsohn's review of the new recent 9/11 films, I would say that we can now add a third "thesis of loss" to the list: loss of reality. This cuts deeper than the assault on meaning brought about by the Enlightenment ideals of a world united around universal truth, ideal that Isaiah Berlin attacked so eloquently. Rather, it has to do with the extent to which media have now impacted what we want reality to be. Here are two paragraphs in which Mendelsohn takes on the United 93 film:

The problem with all this realness is that the film itself—like reality—has no structure and without structure, without shaping, the events can have no large meaning [reflecting, probably unintentionally, back on the Weber thesis]. When United 93 first came out, I was struck by one enthusiastic critic's glowing comment, in a review entitled "Brilliant, Brutal and Utterly Real," that Greengrass's movie was "gripping from first to last, partly because, like a Greek tragedy, we are only too aware of where everything is heading …." But what makes Greek tragedy significant as art is precisely the way in which the foreordained trajectory of the events that take place on stage is made to seem part of a larger moral scheme; when (for instance) we see the horrible spectacle of the humbled kind at the end of Persians, we know why he has been humbled (his greedy overreaching) and who has humbled him (the gods, the moral order that obtains in the cosmos).

All that United 93 can tell us, by contrast, is that many people are brave and some people are dastardly. (Well, many American people are brave: we're treated to a scene in which one of the passengers, who has a Central European accent of some kind, urges the others to cooperate with the hijackers.) If United 93 brings to mind any genre, it's not Greek tragedy, with its artfully wrought moral conundrums, but something much tinier: the innumerable made-for-television programs available on cable TV that are dedicated to reenactments of real-life crimes, complete with phony "realism." The stylistic hallmark of these shows is the same jittery hand-held camerawork that Greengrass uses to represent the violence in the cabin of Flight 93.

Unfortunately, phony realism sells soap (and cars and cereal and drugs for everything from allergies to sexual enhancement, not to mention political candidates); so reality has now been consigned to the same ash-heap as freedom and meaning (which, without reality, is even more lost than in Weber's time). So Isaiah Berlin, towards the end of his life, declared the twentieth century to be "the most terrible century in Western history." Perhaps it is just as well that he never had the opportunity to observe its successor.

June 25, 2006: Service is a Science, or is it?

Thinking back on yesterday's comments about nostalgia, I have decided that not all of the agonies of Hell involve happy memories. One can also be tortured by unpleasant memories, particularly when you feel you could have taken some action (or just said something) to change them. (You might call these the agonies of "coulda-shoulda-woulda.") I had one of those hauntings this morning, so now I have to get it off my chest.

This is a memory from March 24, 2004 and the Almaden Institute I attended that day. The topic was "Work in the era of the global, extensible enterprise;" but the focus was on work in the service sector. The tone was set by the welcoming remarks, which, as I recall, were delivered by Paul Horn, Senior Vice President of IBM Research. The main thing I remember from those remarks can be roughly paraphrased (if not directly quoted) as follows:

Fifty years ago IBM partnered with Columbia University to invent the academic discipline of computer science; today I am announcing that we are partnering with the University of California at Berkeley to invent the discipline of service science.

This was my first unpleasant experience of the day. I had always felt (courtesy of one of the many citations dug up by Knuth) that the foundations of computer science were laid in a series of lectures in the summer of 1946 at the University of Pennsylvania, after their pioneering work in digital computing (the Eniac) for the military during the Second World War. I have to confess to a strong personal bias behind this belief, since the first lecture was delivered on July 8, 1946, which happens to be the day I was born! However, I also remember Edsger Dijkstra's Turing Award speech, in which he talked about those people who can only understand concepts when delivered in their own terminology. The examples he gave were Catholics and Communists; but, when history is involved, I have discovered there are plenty of other examples!

The real memory-agony, however, dealt with the whole idea of their being a science of service, particularly since one of my activities that day involved a break-out session to discuss the curriculum for that new academic discipline. To this day I believe that our session went absolutely nowhere, because we could not think of any area of study that could be excluded from the curriculum; and so it is that I am haunted. Fortunately, I think Hegel has been helping me see some light. My entry about putting philosophy in its place can actually be boiled down to deciding whether the objective of the study of philosophy is descriptive or prescriptive. Hegel came down strongly on the former option, arguing that those descriptions should be as clear as possible, since they depicted "reality as it is." As a result I would extend Hegel and argue that, just as philosophy is a descriptive discipline, science is a prescriptive one, concerned primarily with understanding enough about the natural world to exercise control over it. So, in the tradition of answering one question with another question, before asking if there is a science of service, we might consider the extent to which the study of service can lead to prescriptive results.

Here I would like to cite some of the work of Orion White, a sociologist who was studying service organizations before their operations had been influenced by digital technology. He drew the distinction that a service organization is dialectical, rather than bureaucratic (Public Administration Review, 1969). In more contemporary language we could say that the operations of a service organization cannot be reduced to business processes, which may then be "engineered" for optimal efficiency. Instead, operations are all about recognizing underlying oppositions and resolving them synthetically, rather than coming down on one side or the other as "the way it has to be." I would then argue that, while it may be possible for a bureaucratic organization, one cannot take a prescriptive approach to the operations of a dialectical organization. One can only build up a repertoire of keen descriptive skills, through which one can grasp the reality of the entire situation, and then, with a Habermas-like ambition, apply that grasp to achieving an understanding that is social and subjective, rather than strictly objective. Since science only "plays" in the objective world, the very concept of a service science entails an impoverished view of the world.

What, then, is the primary descriptive goal in the study of service? I would argue that it involves the nature of value and how value is perceived by individuals in their social settings. In this respect one could do worse than begin with the study of the production of value that Marx began to develop at great length in his Grundrisse (even if much of that work went through a major overhaul by the time he was writing Capital). Marx was well aware that the production of value was not strictly a matter of the commodities that enter a production process in one form and leave in another. Much of Marx' attention focused on the consequences of viewing labor, itself, as a commodity; but Habermas expanded his own scope beyond the basic operation and operators of the production line. He presented evidence "that we consider whether the work incorporated in rationalization must not be understood and evaluated as second-order productive labor—as an independent one, because it depends on productive labor of the first order." (In many ways this is Habermas' first recognition of the role that understanding plays in work practices.) Thus, any understanding of the nature of value has to account for the ways in which knowledge contributes to value (an issue that was given lip service during the heady days of the "knowledge movement" but never subjected to the standards of descriptive discipline that Hegel had set for philosophy).

So am I just playing out a pun that the study of service should be grounded in the Grundrisse? Am I trying to send a be-careful-what-you-wish-for message to IBM, because the path to that wish may lead through Marx? No, I am just content to play Hegel's game and do my part towards the depiction of "reality as it is," however, complex that reality may be!

June 23, 2006: Hegel Puts Philosophy in its Place

While reading Habermas' Theory and Practice I came upon his summary of an observation that Hegel made in the preface to the Philosophy of Right: "Philosophy cannot instruct the world about what it ought to be; it is solely reality which is reflected in its concepts, reality as it is."